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FOLLOWING ON THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT: THE DYNAMIC
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUIT
GABRIELA JARA†
ABSTRACT
Corporations that have allegedly violated the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) increasingly face a new threat of liability: cases
brought by private plaintiffs in follow-on derivative suits. These
derivative suits for breaches of fiduciary duty focus on whether
directors provided the necessary oversight through compliance
systems designed to detect and prevent FCPA violations. The demand
requirement, a procedural hurdle of derivative suits, has stymied
plaintiffs that are unable to show that directors cannot disinterestedly
assess whether to pursue a claim for violations. This Note proposes a
framework that systematizes the factual scenarios under which the
demand requirement could be excused. Using other instances of
regulatory violations as a lens, courts can infer that directors knew of
FCPA violations based on patterns of bribes and the importance of
bribery to the overall business of the corporation. Only plaintiffs that
have utilized procedural devices to inspect corporate books and
records, however, can expect courts to reach this inference of director
knowledge. Despite being much maligned, the follow-on derivative
suit may actually clarify the duties of directors in FCPA compliance
and advance the corporate governance reforms of corporations,
separately from the deterrent effect of government enforcement.

INTRODUCTION
On April 21, 2012, a New York Times article reported a failed
investigation into Wal-Mart’s business-driven bribery practices
1
worldwide. The incident that prompted the investigation began in
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2005, when a former executive at Wal-Mart de Mexico (Wal-Mex),
Wal-Mart’s largest foreign subsidiary, alerted Wal-Mart that WalMex had systematically bribed government officials to facilitate
2
expansion across Mexico. The article detailed a carefully organized
system in which bribes were paid through middlemen and concealed
on invoices using secret-code numbers denoting the purpose of each
3
bribe. Wal-Mart’s investigative unit discovered payments totaling
more than $24 million and recommended a full investigation into
4
possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
The article claimed that instead “Wal-Mart’s leaders shut [the
5
investigation] down.” Concerned that the details about the bribes
would reach the public, Wal-Mart’s board of directors decided on a
new course of action: the Wal-Mex general counsel would head the
investigation, effectively giving responsibility to uncover wrongdoing
6
to those under suspicion.
Once Wal-Mart’s bribery scandal made headlines, the California
State Teachers Retirement System (CalSTRS), concerned that WalMart’s bribery practices and the corresponding potential for hefty
penalties would negatively impact its substantial holdings in WalMart, filed a shareholder derivative suit against Wal-Mart’s board in
7
the Delaware Court of Chancery. CalSTRS used the New York
Times article to support allegations that three directors had “direct
contemporaneous knowledge of the bribery allegations” based on
internal communications regarding the preliminary internal
8
investigation. The plaintiffs also alleged that the rest of the board
“would have been informed of the adverse findings,” pursuant to
9
Wal-Mart’s corporate governance guidelines. CalSTRS claimed the
board breached its fiduciary duties by refusing to conduct a full and
independent investigation despite (1) whistleblower evidence that

2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2012); see Barstow,
supra note 1.
5. Barstow, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint, Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez,
No. 7490, at 24 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2012), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/news/
business/walmart-shareholder-complaint.pdf.
8. Id. at 28–29.
9. Id. at 29.
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Wal-Mex paid bribes to foreign officials and (2) the investigative
10
report’s finding that Wal-Mex violated anti-bribery laws.
The suit was derivative in that injury belonged to the
corporation, not the shareholders themselves. A derivative plaintiff
like CalSTRS must satisfy Delaware’s demand requirement. The
demand requirement obligates a plaintiff, before filing suit, to ask the
11
board to bring a suit on behalf of the corporation. Alternatively, a
plaintiff can allege demand futility and ask the court to excuse the
demand requirement by showing that demand would be useless
because the board would be unable to consider the best interests of
12
the corporation in deciding whether to bring a case. CalSTRS sought
to overcome the demand requirement by pleading demand futility
because the directors, having already ignored the need for an
investigation, were now “incapable of impartially investigating or
13
taking appropriate action against themselves and others.” In fact,
multiple shareholder derivative suits against Wal-Mart make similar
allegations and are still in pretrial stages at the time of publication:
14
seven in Delaware and five in Arkansas state and federal court.
Academics and practitioners now recognize the likelihood that
litigation, similar to CalSTRS’s derivative suit, will follow allegations
10. Id. at 2, 3.
11. In shareholder derivative suits, the derivative plaintiff is asserting injury on behalf of
the corporation and is therefore required to demand that the board address this injury. See DEL.
CH. CT. R. 23.1(a) (“The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made
by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable
authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not making the
effort.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3) (requiring particularized pleading like Delaware).
12. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) (“[W]here officers and directors
are under an influence which sterilizes their discretion, they cannot be considered proper
persons to conduct litigation on behalf of the corporation.”), overruled in part on other grounds
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
13. Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint, supra note 7, at 29. Instead, the complaint
alleged that the directors allowed those accused of wrongdoing or their subordinates to head
investigations and “maintain[ed] a wholly inadequate corporate investigations unit.” Id. at 32.
14. See Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement as Seen Through WalMart’s Potential Exposure, WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP., Sept. 21, 2012, at 1, 7 (“[A]t least 12
shareholder lawsuits have been filed against Wal-Mart and/or its officers and directors in the
wake of the Times article.”). See generally In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig.,
No. 4:12-cv-4041, 2012 WL 5935340, at *1 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 27, 2012) (consolidating state and
federal suits against Wal-Mart and ordering a stay of proceedings in Arkansas as consolidated
suits moved forward in the Delaware Court of Chancery). Although the suits are still in early
stages, the extent of alleged wrongdoing at Wal-Mart indicates widespread failings of the
corporate compliance system. See Stephanie Clifford & David Barstow, Wal-Mart Takes a
Broader Look at Bribery Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at A1 (noting that Wal-Mart’s
bribery practices extended to other large country markets, including Brazil, China, and India).
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of FCPA violations. However, these follow-on derivative suits have
been criticized as an ineffective means of enforcing director
17
obligations, because they are subject to heightened pleading
18
requirements. Moreover, commentators attribute little value to
follow-on derivative suits, arguing that such suits are only financially
19
motivated by attorneys’ fees and carry little legal substance.
By contrast, this Note posits that follow-on derivative suits do
possess value in that they provide an opportunity to develop a
15. E.g., Koehler, supra note 14, at 6–7; see George H. Brown, Debra Wong Yang &
Matthew S. Kahn, Strategies for Mitigating Civil Liability Consequences of FCPA Investigations
& Enforcement Actions, SEC. LITIG. REP., Apr. 2012 (reprint at 1), available at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/BrownYangKahn-StrategiesforMitigating
CivilLiabilityConsequences%20(2).pdf (“[F]ollow-on litigation [has] become virtually a
guaranteed by-product of an internal or government FCPA investigation.”); Jason E. Prince, A
Rose by Any Other Name? Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-Inspired Civil Actions, THE
ADVOCATE, Mar./Apr. 2009, at 20, 22–23 (acknowledging a possible surge in shareholder
actions after a class of shareholders received a large securities settlement); see also 2012 MidYear FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN 13–16 (July 9, 2012), http://www.gibsondunn.com/
publications/Documents/2012MidYearFCPAUpdate.pdf (noting that “the continued stream of
FCPA-inspired” litigation and the development of “several new fronts in this landscape”).
16. This Note refers to shareholder derivative suits that allege breaches of fiduciary duty
arising from alleged violations of the FCPA as follow-on derivative suits.
17. Donald A. Corbett & Daniel K. Roque, The Next Wave of FCPA Shareholder
Derivative Actions, 42 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 855, 858 (2010); Gideon Mark, Private FCPA
Enforcement, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 419, 446–47, 459–86 (2012) (indicating that collateral litigation
will likely increase, but arguing that the different forms of collateral litigation are not viable and
thus, a private right of action under the FCPA is necessary); Ann Deen Westbrook, Double
Trouble: Collateral Shareholder Litigation Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Investigation, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1224–26, 1252 (2012) (casting the FCPA-related
shareholder derivative suit as a phenomenon arising from the lack of a private cause of action
and arguing that federal securities actions serve as better vehicles in private litigation).
18. See infra Part II.
19. FCPA investigations and derivative suits have been widely covered by specialized
blogs. See, e.g., Mike Koehler, A Purpose or Parasitic?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Feb. 15, 2012),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-purpose-or-parasitic (noting that, only in the “rare” event
directors have encouraged an FCPA violation, a derivative suit would be justified); Mike
Koehler, Nice Pay Day, but What Did You Accomplish?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 20, 2012),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/nice-pay-day-but-what-did-you-accomplish
(arguing
that
companies will settle with plaintiffs “for what amounts to nuisance value” and that plaintiffs
actually do not accomplish anything, except a pay day); Kevin LaCroix, Faltering Lawsuits:
Dismissal Motions Hit FCPA Follow-On Civil Actions and Say-on-Pay Suits, D&O DIARY (July
30, 2012), http://www.dandodiary.com/2012/07/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act/falteringlawsuits-dismissal-motions-hit-fcpa-followon-civil-actions-and-sayonpay-suits
(noting
the
lawsuits that have failed to make it past pleading stages and that “[i]f nothing else, these cases
show that claimants eager to pursue shareholder derivative suits following on FCPA
investigations cannot dispense with the procedural prerequisites”); see also Brown et al., supra
note 15 (reprint at 1) (noting that private parties have “devised many creative ways to ride into
court on the coattails of an alleged FCPA violation” and that some of these plaintiffs have
achieved significant monetary, though not legal, success).
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coherent body of law regarding the obligations of directors of
corporations that have allegedly violated positive law. Regardless of
whether demand is excused or the case settles or is dismissed, the
FCPA follow-on derivative suit serves an important purpose in
improving corporate compliance with the FCPA’s provisions. In some
cases, for example, director behavior may be egregious enough to
infer knowledge and impose liability for breach of fiduciary duties.
Weaker cases involving decentralized management, however, are
unlikely to allege demand futility required for a derivative suit to
withstand dismissal, but plaintiffs may still influence director behavior
by negotiating settlements that include specific corporate governance
reforms that reduce the risk of future FCPA violations.
The liability underlying an FCPA follow-on derivative suit is
20
premised on a Caremark claim. Plaintiffs alleging a Caremark claim
assert that directors breached their oversight duties to the
21
22
corporation. Although Caremark claims are difficult to win, this
Note offers a framework for understanding cases in which plaintiffs
have successfully pled demand futility based on violations of positive
law. The presented typology carves out a subset of cases and factual
scenarios worthy of shareholder scrutiny into whether directors knew
about possible violations and fulfilled their oversight duties. In
follow-on derivative suits, courts have hesitated to infer directors’
knowledge of FCPA violations; however, inferring knowledge may be
reasonable when directors participate in direct control of defective
compliance programs that led to violations of federal law.
Furthermore, this Note acknowledges the practical challenges of
shareholder derivative suits and sets FCPA follow-on derivative suits
within the context of the Delaware Court of Chancery’s recent
encouragement to plaintiffs to use procedural devices to support their
pleadings.
This Note opens in Part I with background on the FCPA and
government enforcement. Part II focuses on the pleading burdens of
Caremark cases and details how the demand-futility requirement has

20. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
21. 4 THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS
535–39 (Stephen A. Radin ed., 6th ed. 2009).
22. See e.g., Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (“The theory here advanced is possibly the most
difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”);
Claire A. Hill & Brett McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1777 (2007) (“Caremark duties are deliberately structured to make it
extremely hard for plaintiffs to win.”).
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been applied in FCPA follow-on derivative cases. Part III introduces
a series of cases in which corporations violated positive law—namely
off-label advertising and Medicare/Medicaid federal regulations—and
plaintiffs successfully pled demand futility. These examples urge a
new approach to the elusive Caremark obligations of directors,
specifically as they relate to obligations to oversee FCPA-compliance
systems. In addition to explaining how courts have misapplied case
law on the failure to monitor and the breach of good-faith and loyalty
duties in FCPA cases, the discussion of Caremark’s progeny sets the
stage for a more flexible approach to inferring director knowledge of
violations. Part IV elucidates the value of FCPA derivative follow-on
suits in influencing corporate behavior and encouraging compliance
systems even when plaintiffs unsuccessfully plead demand futility and
negotiate a settlement.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE FCPA
The FCPA is a major source of potential liability for
24
corporations with widespread global operations. The Department of
Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have
criminal and civil enforcement authority, respectively, over violations
by public companies; the DOJ also has criminal and civil enforcement
25
authority over FCPA violations by domestic concerns. Part of the
26
1934 Securities Exchange Act (Exchange Act), the FCPA applies to

23. This Note focuses on Delaware corporate law because the majority of corporations are
incorporated in Delaware, and even if corporations are incorporated elsewhere, many states
follow Delaware’s demand-futility analysis. See infra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its
Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 396 (2010) (“But with the increase of
globalization . . . it is no longer just large resource extraction companies doing business in
overseas markets that need to be concerned with the FCPA.”); Carl Pacini, The Foreign Corrupt
Practice Act: Taking a Bite out of Bribery in International Business Transactions, 17 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 545, 560–61 (2012) (explaining how the FCPA reaches foreign subsidiaries
and joint ventures); Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Minefield for Directors, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 145, 147–49 (underscoring the need
for companies to be aware of FCPA risks even if not currently operating in a major BRIC
market because of the “potential for corporate catastrophe”).
25. Mark, supra note 17, at 426–27; see CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4–5 (2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf (explaining the SEC and DOJ’s
enforcement authority over issuers (public companies) and the DOJ’s authority over domestic
concerns (non-issuers) which includes American citizens, nationals, residents, businesses, and
foreign persons or businesses that commit an FCPA violation while in the United States).
26. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012).
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all issuers of securities registered with the SEC and companies subject
27
to the Exchange Act’s reporting requirements.
There are two main grounds for liability under the FCPA. First,
anti-bribery provisions make it illegal to offer, promise, authorize, or
make a payment of money or anything of value to a foreign official in
28
exchange for obtaining or retaining business. Second, provisions on
29
recordkeeping and internal controls require Exchange Act issuers to
file reports that provide “reasonable detail” of transactions and
30
assets. A corporation that offered bribes and then mischaracterized
the bribes as proper business expenses runs the risk of both criminal
31
and civil liability. Issuers must also devise an internal auditing
control system “sufficient to provide reasonable assurances” that
32
transactions meet the compliance requirements set by management.
Violations of the accounting provisions are actionable in civil
proceedings but only constitute a criminal offense when a person
33
knowingly violates or fails to implement internal controls.
The last several years have marked the busiest years for FCPA
34
enforcement since the law was enacted in 1977. In 2010 and 2011, the
35
DOJ and SEC initiated a combined total of 122 proceedings —more
36
than any previous year. In 2012, the number of enforcement
37
proceedings declined, but the number of open investigations, both
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (2012) (defining “issuer” for purposes of the FCPA).
28. Id. § 78dd-1(a).
29. Id. §§ 78m(a)–(b). These accounting provisions constituted a major expansion of SEC
powers. See SEC v. World-Wide Coin. Invest., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 746–47 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(noting that the accounting provisions of the FCPA extend SEC authority over the financial
management and accounting of corporations “beyond the traditional ambit of disclosure
requirements”).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
31. See CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 39 (“[I]t is never
appropriate to mischaracterize transactions in a company’s books and records.”).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
33. Id. § 78m(b)(4), (5); see Koehler, supra note 24, at 396.
34. See, e.g., John Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe, The Recent and Unusual Evolution of an
Expanding FCPA, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 25, 26 (2012) (noting that FCPA
prosecutions have “skyrocketed” and huge “penalties or fines [have] been the routine, almost
commonplace result”); Corbett & Roque, supra note 17, at 855 (arguing that “renewed
enforcement” of the FCPA has triggered the emergence of collateral civil litigation related to
bribery).
35. 2012 Mid-Year FCPA Update, supra note 15, at 2.
36. See Mark, supra note 17, at 431 (underscoring the stark contrast in enforcement in 2010
and 2011 as compared to 2004, when only five actions were initiated).
37. 2013 Mid-Year
FCPA
Update, GIBSON DUNN
2
(July 8,
2013),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2013-Mid-Year-FCPA-Update.pdf
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criminal and civil, remained high at about 150 DOJ and 80 SEC
38
investigations.
The pace and scale of recent FCPA-enforcement activity is due
39
to efficient enforcement methods. The government may resolve
investigations without undertaking full prosecutions. Rather, the DOJ
utilizes deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and nonprosecution agreements (NPAs) to resolve cases of bribery,
accounting misconduct, and money laundering related to FCPA
40
violations. Under these agreements, the DOJ need not expend
41
resources to satisfy the burden of proof in a criminal prosecution,
and a corporation avoids a criminal indictment but remains liable for
fines, disgorgement of profits, prejudgment interest, and may be
42
obligated to undertake corporate reforms. Corporations are
43
motivated to disclose FCPA violations to avoid indictment and to
44
receive leniency in the assessment of penalties.
In response to the successful efforts of the DOJ and SEC, robust
academic discussion and critique have developed, with many
(explaining that in 2010 and 2011, respectively, there were seventy-four and forty-eight DOJ
and SEC actions combined, but that in 2012, there were only twenty-three). By the middle of
2013, sixteen new cases had been initiated, id., indicating a “return to the robust levels of recent
years” after the “relative downtick” in 2012, id. at 1.
38. Mark, supra note 17, at 432.
39. See Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a
New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 104 (2011) (explaining the stark contrast between the $1.8
billion in fines in 2010 and the single enforcement action in 2000 for a $300,000 fine as resulting
from “a remarkable transformation . . . [in] FCPA enforcement and theories of prosecution”).
40. WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY IN INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN THE UNITED STATES 11, 32 (2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/antibribery/anti-briberyconvention/UnitedStatesphase3reportEN.pdf.
41. Koehler, supra note 39, at 129.
42. See Mark, supra note 17, at 431–34 (detailing the use of different enforcement methods
by the DOJ and SEC in specific cases).
43. See id. at 430–31 (noting that up to 60 percent of government enforcement actions are a
result of voluntary corporate disclosures).
44. See Sarah Marberg, Note, Promises of Leniency: Whether Companies Should SelfDisclose Violations of the FCPA, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 557, 574–77 (2012) (suggesting
widespread skepticism that the DOJ actually credits companies that voluntarily disclose despite
DOJ attempts to incentivize cooperation both officially and unofficially). A corporation that
refuses to disclose voluntarily runs the risk of higher penalties, but may also be subject to
private liability under securities-fraud regulations. See RAYMOND WONG & PATRICK CONROY,
NERA ECON. CONSULTING, FCPA SETTLEMENTS: IT’S A SMALL WORLD AFTER ALL 5 ex.1,
7–9 (2009), available at http://www.nera.com/extImage/Pub_FCPA_Settlements_0109_Final2
.pdf (detailing cases brought against corporations for nondisclosure under Securities Rule 10b-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013), and tracking market capitalization losses as a result of publicized
FCPA violations).
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commentators focusing on the shortcomings of government
45
enforcement. For example, because almost all enforcement actions
are resolved with DPAs, corporations face an uncertain landscape of
46
liability without the benefit of judicial interpretation. Instead, FCPA
liability is “improperly developing through the terms and conditions
47
of DPAs, rather than by jury verdicts and appellate court decisions.”
Recently released government implementation guidelines clarify
48
FCPA requirements for corporations. The guidelines identify the
factors the government considers in evaluating existing compliance
49
efforts. However, they do not explicitly delineate the responsibilities
for a director or an officer of a corporation beyond vague
admonitions to remain committed to a “culture of compliance” and to
50
carry out the compliance system in “good faith.” Judicial
interpretation of FCPA liability would facilitate compliance efforts by
unpacking these substantive responsibilities of directors that, as the
examples above demonstrate, are not self-defining. In follow-on
derivative suits, judicial interpretation of director liability after an
45. See generally Ashcroft & Ratcliffe, supra note 34; Lauren Giudice, Note, Regulating
Corruption: Analyzing Uncertainty in Current Foreign Corrupt Practice Act Enforcement, 91
B.U. L. REV. 347 (2011); Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L.
907 (2010); Pacini, supra note 24; Cortney C. Thomas, Note, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A
Decade of Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439 (2010).
Commentators focusing on reforms to the FCPA have primarily advocated for leniency reforms,
such as an amendment that incorporates a good-faith compliance defense. E.g. Mike Koehler,
Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practice Act Compliance Defense, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 609, 617, 654
(2012); Michael B. Mukasey & James C. Dunlop, Can Someone Please Turn on the Lights?
Bringing Transparency to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, ENGAGE, Mar. 2012, at 30, 49; cf.
Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposal for a United States Department of Justice
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 213–23 (2010)
(arguing for a leniency policy modeled after antitrust policies in light of the large-scale
cooperation of corporations under investigation for FCPA violations).
46. See Ashcroft & Ratcliffe, supra note 34, at 34 (noting that terms like “foreign official”
and “bribe,” after more than thirty-four years, remain “undefined”).
47. Id. at 33. Only one corporation has been tried and convicted of FCPA violations. Mark,
supra note 17, at 443. That conviction was subsequently vacated. United States v. Aguilar, 831 F.
Supp. 2d 1180, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
48. See, e.g., CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 24–26 (explaining
which types of payments constitute illegal expenditures and when the FCPA exemption for
facilitation payments applies).
49. See id. at 53 (listing the “pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including
the complicity in, or the condoning of, the wrongdoing by corporate management” as one of the
factors, among many others, informing the decision to investigate possible violations).
50. Id. at 57 (quoting Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC
Implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley: The New Corporate Governance, Remarks at National
Economists Club (April 7, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch040703cag.htm)).
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FCPA violation would provide important jurisprudential data points
for corporate directors and officers overseeing compliance systems.
Responses to FCPA violations indicate that corporations are
well-served by looking beyond the government action to the
51
downstream private collateral litigation that follows. Company
securities disclosures or news of a settlement between a corporation
52
and the DOJ or SEC often trigger private actions. Most
53
commentators expect this trend to continue. The absence of a
54
private cause of action under the FCPA itself means that private
actors have resorted to other legal avenues to bring claims arising
from an alleged FCPA violation—the shareholder derivative suit
among them.
II. HURDLES TO ALLEGING DEMAND FUTILITY
This Part explains the main procedural requirement in
shareholder derivative suits: demand on the board, or alternatively,
demand futility. First, this Part lays out seminal Delaware case law
that guides the analysis of when demand is futile. It then argues that
courts outside of Delaware have misapplied demand futility in FCPA
follow-on derivative suits. Second, this Part addresses the intersection
of demand with pleading the directors’ failure to monitor and
underscores how the analyses at the procedural stages of demand and
pleading require an inquiry into substantive law of director and
officer obligations.

51. See Jeffrey S. Johnston & Erika Tristán, The Next FCPA Battleground: Private Civil
Lawsuits Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Settlements with U.S. Government Authorities,
LITIG. NEWS (Vinson & Elkins, Houston, Tex.), Winter 2011, at 1–4, available at
http://www.velaw.com/uploadedFiles/VEsite/Resources/VELitigationNewsWinter2011.pdf
(noting that even after corporations settle with the government, private parties employ a variety
of legal measures, including civil RICO claims and securities fraud actions, against
corporations).
52. Id. at 2.
53. See Corbett & Roque, supra note 17, at 855 (“[The FCPA enforcement] spike will
undoubtedly result in an increase in parallel civil litigation.”); Mark, supra note 17, at 447 (“The
expected continued expansion of FCPA enforcement is likely to be mirrored in a concomitant
increase in additional collateral litigation.”).
54. Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1029 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that a private
right of action is not available under the FCPA in part because a private right of action “would
directly contravene the carefully tailored FCPA scheme presently in place”).
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A. Mechanics of the Demand Requirement
Requiring plaintiffs to show that demand is futile affords them
the opportunity to explain why the directors are not equipped to
handle litigation due to self-interest or incapacity to act in the best
55
interests of the corporation. After first detailing the contours of this
requirement, this Section argues that state courts conducting the
demand-futility inquiry in FCPA cases have confused the two
Delaware tests for demand futility—(1) board action, or malfeasance,
and (2) board inaction, or nonfeasance. This confusion has increased
the burden on shareholders to argue that demand should be excused
and has led to skepticism about the value of shareholder litigation.
1. Delaware Demand-Futility Analysis: Alleging Director Interest.
The demand requirement reinforces the basic premise of corporate
law that the board of directors is tasked with the management of and
discretion over the affairs of the corporation. The default rule is that
56
the directors manage the corporation’s “business and affairs.” Thus,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1(b)(3)(A) and (B) and Delaware
Chancery Rule 23.1(a) impose a demand requirement for shareholder
57
derivative suits. The demand requirement, as “a natural outgrowth”
of the board’s authority, requires that plaintiffs in derivative suits
appeal to the board of directors before bringing a suit on the
58
corporation’s behalf. As compared to shareholder plaintiffs, the
board of directors is better positioned to respond to the corporation’s
59
alleged injury. In addition to preserving the board’s authority over

55. See, e.g., In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 581–82 (Del. Ch.
2007) (outlining the ways a plaintiff “can show that a director is unable to act objectively with
respect to pre-suit demand,” including interest in the litigation outcome, close personal
relationships, and structural bias arising from a director beholden to another); Claire A. Hill &
Brett H. McDonnell, Fiduciary Duties: The Emerging Jurisprudence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 133, 136 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds.,
2012) (explaining that plaintiffs must “present particularized facts . . . that a majority of the
board is interested or lacking in independence or else that the board does not deserve the
protection of the business judgment rule”).
56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3)(A)–(B); DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(a).
58. Andrew C.W. Lund, Rethinking Aronson: Board Authority and Overdelegation, 11 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 703, 703–04 (2009).
59. See, e.g., La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 339 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(describing the many resources within the board’s reach including full information of the
corporation’s business dealings, internal expertise, and the ability to reach a compromise with
the alleged wrongdoer), rev’d on other grounds, No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013).
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suits, the demand requirement is also intended to filter out groundless
60
litigation quickly and efficiently.
A plaintiff can only circumvent the board by alleging that
demand, had it been made, would have been futile, which a plaintiff
61
can do only by calling into question the impartiality of the board.
The mechanism for excusing demand makes it possible to enforce
director fiduciary duties in cases in which directors engaged in
62
malfeasance. A plaintiff’s challenge to a specific decision or action
63
by the board is subject to the Aronson v. Lewis test, which requires
particularized allegations that “create a reasonable doubt” that the
64
board’s decision should receive business-judgment protection and
that the directors were “disinterested and independent” at the time
65
the complaint was filed. If the plaintiff does not challenge any
specific action by the board and instead seeks to establish liability for
66
the board’s inaction, courts apply Rales v. Blasband. A court
applying the Rales test asks whether directors could have responded
to the demand with independent and disinterested business
67
judgment.
Courts look to the law of the state of incorporation—in many
68
cases, Delaware law—to identify the standards for demand futility.

60. Jack B. Jacobs, The Vanishing Substance-Procedure Distinction in Contemporary
Corporate Litigation: An Essay, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007).
61. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). The discussion of structural bias as grounds for
excusing demand is outside the scope of this Note. The interpersonal relationship of directors
certainly may play a part in demonstrating that the board, as a whole, is unable to consider
demand objectively, but such issues are more about fact-specific allegations regarding the inner
dynamic of corporations than about a compliance system that has failed to avert a violation of
positive law. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d
1040, 1051–52 (Del. 2004); Hill & McDonnell, supra note 55, at 142 (distinguishing the stricter
standard of review for structural bias from the weaker standard for Caremark oversight claims).
62. Lund, supra note 58, at 712.
63. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
64. Id. at 808. The business judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the
honest belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the company.” Id. at 812.
65. Id. at 814.
66. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993).
67. Id. at 934.
68. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108–09 (1991); Faith Stevelman,
Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 57, 66 (2009). In circumstances in which Delaware law does not apply, plaintiffs may
face a universal demand requirement that is likely to completely foreclose an FCPA follow-on
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Even if the corporation is incorporated elsewhere, many states follow
69
the Rales and Aronson tests. These tests for demand futility provide
an extraordinary remedy in cases in which the board’s impartiality is
70
questioned, but the analysis is weighted in favor of the board.
Typically, a plaintiff can allege interest under Aronson or Rales
by pointing to self-dealing by a director who appears on both sides of
71
a transaction or by showing that a director is interested due to a
threat of personal liability because a suit by the corporation would be
72
detrimental to him. Alternatively, a plaintiff may question a
director’s independence by alleging that a director is dominated by a
73
personal relationship or an interested director. Claims against a
specific director’s interest or independence, however, cannot be
74
imputed to the rest of the board. Pleadings must be particularized to
individual directors, and to excuse demand, a court must reasonably
75
doubt the independence or interest of a majority of the board.
2. Confusion Outside Delaware. This Section gives an example
of how the demand analyses have been particularly complicated in
derivative suit without making demand on the board. See, e.g., Haw. Structural Ironworkers
Pension Trust ex rel. Alcoa, Inc. v. Belda, No. 08-0614, 2008 WL 2705548, at *7 (W.D. Pa. July 9,
2008) (dismissing the FCPA follow-on derivative suit because the plaintiff failed to satisfy the
“very narrow” irreparable-harm demand exception and could not show threat to standing);
RALPH C. FERRARA, KEVIN T. ABIKOFF & LAURA LEEDY GANSLER, SHAREHOLDER
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION: BESIEGING THE BOARD § 6.03 n.3 (2013) (enumerating the
jurisdictions that have adopted a universal demand requirement to avoid the “inconsistent and
confusing” demand-required and demand-futility analyses). Other jurisdictions entirely
foreclose shareholder derivative suits. For example, a pension fund unsuccessfully brought a
derivative suit against the directors of BAE Systems PLC (BAE) for making bribes to Saudi
officials. City of Harper Woods Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Olver, 589 F.3d 1292, 1294–95 (D.C. Cir.
2009). Because BAE was incorporated in the United Kingdom, the old common-law rule of
Foss v. Harbottle, 67 Eng. Rep. 189, 202 (Ch. 1843), dictated that if harm was done to a
company, the company was the only plaintiff with standing. Olver, 589 F.3d at 1294–95.
69. See, e.g., In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 803 (7th Cir.
2003) (holding that Illinois follows Delaware in using Aronson).
70. See In re INFOUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 986 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“The
spirit that clearly animates each test is a Court’s unwillingness to set aside the prerogatives of a
board of directors unless the derivative plaintiff has shown some reason to doubt that the board
will exercise its discretion impartially and in good faith.”).
71. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
72. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993).
73. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25 n.50 (Del. Ch. 2002); see also supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
74. See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 943 (Del. Ch. 2007) (explaining that there is
no “universally applicable rule about knowledge imputation”).
75. Id.
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the FCPA context. Because some claims allege both wrongful action
and inaction by the board, courts must choose between Rales and
76
Aronson. Whereas the dual pleading may be seen as a sleight of
hand, the determination of whether Rales or Aronson should apply is
very fact specific: allegations that the board consciously ignored
violations fall under Aronson, and allegations that the board failed to
act, without more, trigger Rales.
Conflating the Rales and Aronson standards proves particularly
problematic when courts distort the demand-futility analysis by
focusing on the wrong board action as the reference point for
determining whether a director is interested in the challenged actions.
Specifically, courts have defaulted to framing bribery as an action
which itself requires director self-dealing. For example, in Strong ex
77
rel. Tidewater, Inc. v. Taylor, the complaint alleged that directors
78
refused to enforce anti-bribery policies, but the court could not
decide whether these allegations constituted inaction under Rales or
79
willful inaction under Aronson.
Foregoing the issue of
nonenforcement, the court instead focused on whether the directors
80
were personally interested in the underlying bribery. Because the
court concluded that the directors were not self-dealing and did not
receive any personal benefit from the bribes, the directors were found
81
to be disinterested and demand was not excused.
Here, the court used the wrong decision by the board as its
reference point. The analysis considered only the underlying act of
bribery. However, the decision of how to address violations or
enforce bribery policies goes to the question of director involvement
not in the crime of bribery but in the cover-up. The court should have
focused on whether directors decided not to enforce policies or knew
about violations but did nothing, rather than requiring proof that the
directors themselves offered bribes or received pecuniary benefit.
Excusing demand only when a director has made a bribe for his own

76. See Donald A. Corbett & Daniel K. Roque, FCPA Shareholder Derivative Plaintiffs
Rack Up Strikes but Keep Swinging, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 18, 2013, at 1, 3 (noting attempts by plaintiffs
to “frame their claims based on affirmative board conduct, as opposed to a failure to monitor”).
77. Strong ex rel. Tidewater, Inc. v. Taylor, 877 F. Supp. 2d 433 (E.D. La. 2012).
78. Id. at 439.
79. Id. at 444.
80. Id. at 445.
81. Id.
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benefit obviates the fact that plaintiffs are bringing claims for a
82
director’s failure to provide oversight, not for self-dealing.
Confusion over the proper application of Rales and Aronson
arises because the action-or-inaction line is difficult to delineate and
subject to manipulation in how plaintiffs plead their cases. The main
problem, however, is ensuring that the court is considering the right
baseline decision for determining whether a board is interested or
not. In FCPA cases, as shown above, this decision will likely turn on
83
how the company responded to potential violations. Only in rare
cases will it focus on the actual act of bribing a foreign official or
84
approving a bribe.
B. Pleading Failure To Monitor
To successfully plead demand futility in oversight cases, a
plaintiff must allege that a director is interested because it is
substantially likely that the director violated a duty. As this Section
explains, there are two levels of pleading in oversight cases. First, the
plaintiff must allege a Caremark violation, a very high threshold that
requires a showing that the directors violated their oversight duties
85
either through action or inaction. The substantive law on directors’
oversight duties—upon which all FCPA follow-on derivative suits are
premised—has evolved from a reconfiguration of the duty of loyalty
86
and good faith. Second, the plaintiff must show futility arising from
the directors’ interest and inability to impartially consider a demand
because it is substantially likely they are liable. To show (1) bad faith
for the Caremark violation and (2) substantial likelihood of liability
for demand futility, plaintiffs must allege the directors knew they
were violating a duty. The intersection of knowledge for the
Caremark and demand-futility analyses is briefly introduced in this
Section and fleshed out further in Part III.

82. See infra notes 107–11 and accompanying text.
83. See Strong, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 444; see also Freuler v. Parker, 803 F. Supp. 2d 630, 641
(S.D. Tex. 2011) (alleging the defendant directors “failed to establish and maintain” FCPA
controls and “failed to enforce . . . existing policies”), aff’d, No. 12-20260, 2013 WL 1153058 (5th
Cir. Mar. 11, 2013) (per curiam).
84. E.g., La. Mun. Police Em. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CVM-509-JCM, 2013 WL
431339, at *1 (D. Nev. Feb. 1, 2013).
85. See supra Part II.A.1 for the distinct standards for action (Aronson) or inaction (Rales)
in demand futility.
86. Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 457, 464, 470–73 (2009); see also infra note 99.
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1. Caremark Liability and Demand-Futility Analysis.
A
Caremark claim stems from a board decision resulting in loss due to
negligence (action, an Aronson problem) or an “unconsidered failure
of the board to act” if action would have prevented loss to the
87
corporation (inaction, a Rales problem). Under Caremark, plaintiffs
must show (1) a breach of fiduciary duty based on the directors’
actual knowledge of legal violations or (2) that directors should have
known of legal violations and breached their duty of good faith in
88
failing “to prevent or remedy [the] situation.” Only an “utter failure
to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system
exists” establishes the bad faith necessary to find that a director has
89
failed to exercise oversight. Given this high standard, implementing
a compliance system is likely sufficient to avoid Caremark liability;
even if the system is inadequate, liability is unlikely, so long as the
system is not so grossly inadequate as to implicate a director’s bad
90
faith because he knew it was inadequate and failed to monitor it.
The intersection between Caremark liability and the demandfutility analysis requires a close examination of the scenarios that
would give rise to a claim. Caremark opened the door to director
liability in the absence of conflicts of interest but still limited liability
91
to extreme circumstances of director misconduct. Oversight failures
include scenarios of both action and inaction, for example, (1) a
director who knowingly violated the law, (2) a director who knew of
possible violations but took no action, or (3) a director who caused
92
the corporation to violate the law to yield greater profits. A board
that has “consciously failed to act” even after receiving evidence of a
93
“red flag” alerting the directors they were breaching their duties

87. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
88. Id. at 971. In Caremark, shareholders brought a derivative suit against directors alleging
that they had breached their duty of care by failing to supervise the company’s contracts with
physicians, which led to federal liability for violation of anti-kickback laws. Id. at 961–64.
89. Id. at 971.
90. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (en banc)
(outlining “necessary conditions predicate” to liability as a complete failure to implement a
system or when there is a system, failure to monitor, and “disabling [the directors] from being
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention”).
91. DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS LAW AND PRACTICE
17–18 (2012).
92. Id.
93. See La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 341 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(discussing “the proverbial ‘red flag’”), rev’d on other grounds, No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695 (Del.
Apr. 4, 2013).
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may straddle (1) and (2). Lack of action, just like a decision to
outright violate a law, would constitute a board decision subject to
94
challenge under Aronson. If the board did not act, and Rales applies
instead, Caremark requires “a sustained or systematic failure . . . to
95
exercise oversight.”
Caremark expanded director oversight duties while also
“constrain[ing] courts’ authority to hold directors liable for poor
96
compliance decisions.” Caremark, in tandem with Stone ex rel.
97
AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, requires that directors carry out
monitoring duties and ensure that a reasonable compliance system is
in place. The liability for breach, however, only arises when the
director acted in bad faith by consciously or knowingly failing to
98
fulfill the duty concerning compliance and monitoring. Stone
clarified that good-faith violations arising from Caremark oversight
99
liability were actually a subset of duty of loyalty claims.
2. Bribery and the Duties of Directors. This Section explains (1)
how the development of the duty of loyalty in Delaware
jurisprudence affects the analysis of director duties insofar as bribery
is concerned and (2) the challenges facing a plaintiff who must plead
demand futility by relying on allegations of a violation of oversight
duties. The most obvious violation of the duty of loyalty occurs when
100
a director has a conflict of interest or engages in self-dealing. But
the duty of loyalty currently encompasses more than eliminating
101
conflicts of interest and an obligation to abstain from self-dealing.

94. See id. (“The decision to act [to violate the law] and the conscious decision not to act
are thus equally subject to review under traditional fiduciary duty principles and equally able to
create the requisite connection to the board.”).
95. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
96. Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone: Directors’ Evolving
Duty To Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 325 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009).
97. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (en banc).
98. Arlen, supra note 96, at 325–26.
99. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70; Hill & McDonnell, supra note 22, at 1778. Stone resolved a
prior disagreement over whether the duty of good faith was a freestanding duty that existed
separately from the duties of care and loyalty. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good
Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 12–14 (2006) (outlining then-Vice Chancellor
Strine’s opposition to the “triadic formulation of duties of corporate managers” in favor of an
approach in which good faith is part of the duty of loyalty); id. at 15–21 (disagreeing with the
“dyadic” approach to the duty of good faith based on Delaware precedent and the meaning of
“faith” as compared to “good faith”).
100. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 22, at 1779.
101. Gold, supra note 86, at 488.
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Professors Hill and McDonnell outline three scenarios aside from the
traditional self-dealing violation that violate the duty of loyalty: (1)
when directors defer excessively to each other to the detriment of the
corporation, (2) when directors act with “suspect motive[s]” in
following a course of action that benefits them, and (3) when
directors are themselves involved in violations of positive law or have
failed to monitor the conduct of other actors who engaged in illegal
102
action.
The last category, unlike the first two, does not necessarily
103
involve a conflict of interest between directors and shareholders.
For example, a bribe may facilitate and enhance the corporation’s
business, and a director who encourages the payment of a bribe may
104
do so with the objective of furthering the corporation’s business.
This scenario, in which a director engages in outright illegal behavior,
clearly violates the duty of loyalty notwithstanding the absence of a
105
conflict of interest. Less clear is whether a director breaches the
duty of loyalty by failing to monitor corporate practices that may lead
106
to bribery.
Despite the expansion of the duty of loyalty to non-selfinterested conduct, courts outside of Delaware insist on trying to fit
the FCPA-related Caremark claims into the traditional self-dealing
paradigm of loyalty violations. In Strong, the district court dismissed
the complaint for failure to plead demand futility because the

102. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 22, at 1780–81.
103. Id. at 1784; see also Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 38 (arguing, prior to the Stone decision,
that a knowing violation of the law “will seldom violate the duty of loyalty” because the director
has not acted out of self-interest).
104. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 22, at 1784.
105. See id. at 1784–85 (suggesting reasons to equate illegal behavior with a violation of
loyalty because illegal behavior indicates a propensity for other conduct that may “directly
diverge[] with the shareholders’ interests or because of a duty owed to the public more generally
to ensure the corporation is law-abiding”); see also Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 31 (explaining
the “well established principle” that a director cannot cause a corporation to violate the law
even if the violation is profit maximizing because any profit is outweighed by the penalty and
reputational damage).
106. See Gold, supra note 86, at 485 (citing Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 38) (“Trying to
squeeze such conduct into the duty of loyalty is like trying to squeeze the foot of Cinderella’s
stepsister into Cinderella’s glass slipper—an enterprise equally painful and fruitless.”); Hill &
McDonnell, supra note 22, at 1785 (“[D]irectors are shirking their responsibility to be vigilant
when they, on some metric, ‘ought’ to know what their lack of vigilance might permit; hence, the
violation of the duty of good faith.”); id. at 1780 (arguing that “snoozing,” though superficially
less serious than “stealing,” may still be problematic depending on the motivation behind
director’s inattention).
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107

directors did not themselves benefit from any bribes. The court’s
analysis failed to recognize that, under a Caremark claim, self-dealing
is not required for demand futility; instead, demand futility can be
pled by showing a substantial likelihood of liability for failing to
108
oversee the violation. A court’s focus on the underlying act of
bribery would be appropriate when the directors are themselves
implicated in approving the bribe. Even in that case, however, self109
dealing is not the only road to excusing demand. For example, in a
recent FCPA follow-on derivative suit, the district court decided
whether directors, who had allegedly approved a bribe to a public
110
institution in Macau, were interested. The court did not look for
evidence the directors were self-dealing when they approved the
bribe, but reasoned that the directors may be interested since they
111
may be liable for violating the FCPA.
FCPA follow-on derivative suits are thus different from other
Caremark cases because the underlying facts pertaining to corporate
bribery are unlikely to hinge on a director’s own self-interest or selfdealing in a transaction. In other duty of loyalty cases, such as claims
against the board for backdating stock options for directors and
112
officers, there are clear grounds on which to allege that directors are
interested in the challenged transaction. In the bribery context,
however, a plaintiff is likely unable to show individual directors
benefitted directly from a bribe to a government official. Whereas in
the “first wave” of the 1970s, plaintiffs alleged direct participation by
directors and officers, plaintiffs during the current “second wave” of
derivative suits allege that directors failed to monitor FCPA risks and

107. Strong ex rel. Tidewater, Inc. v. Taylor, 877 F. Supp. 2d. 433, 445 (E.D. La. 2012).
108. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 22, at 1780; see La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott,
46 A.3d 313, 340 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“Without a substantial threat of director liability, a court has
no reason to doubt the board’s ability to evaluate a demand.”), rev’d on other grounds, No. 380,
2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013).
109. See La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CVM-509-JCM, 2013 WL
431339, at *5 (D. Nev. Feb. 1, 2013) (employing the substantial likelihood of liability test for
director interest).
110. Id. at *1, *5.
111. Id. at *6. Nevada law requires knowledge that a bribe was illegal to excuse demand.
The court held the plaintiffs had insufficiently alleged that the directors knew the payment was
illegal and dismissed the complaint. Id.
112. See, e.g., Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 909 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Tyson Foods,
Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 583 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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113

compliance. These Caremark claims allow plaintiffs to sue directors
114
who were not themselves involved in bribery.
Demand futility remains a major hurdle, even if the director
need not be the one receiving or giving a bribe. To overcome this
procedural hurdle, there must be some other reason why the directors
cannot disinterestedly respond to the violation and why the plaintiff
should be allowed to defend the corporation’s interests instead.
Courts have rejected different bases for questioning directors’
motivation. For example, a plaintiff cannot rely on an allegation that
directors are interested based solely on the fact that they receive
115
compensation or that compensation motivated them to circumvent
116
or refuse to enforce anti-bribery policies. Instead, the shareholder
claim under Caremark must “contend[] that the directors set in
motion or ‘allowed a situation to develop and continue which exposed
the corporation to enormous legal liability and that in doing so they
117
violated a duty to be active monitors of corporate performance.’” It
is not, however, necessary to demonstrate a “reasonable probability
118
of success on the merits.” If plaintiffs can show that directors failed
to monitor and that directors knew they were violating a fiduciary
119
duty by “conscious[ly] disregard[ing] their responsibilities,” they are
more likely to demonstrate a failure of oversight and a substantial
likelihood of liability under the demand-futility analysis for director
interest.
Thus, the procedural and substantive aspects of the suit collapse
into one another because the plaintiff must show a connection
between the “corporate calamity” and the board that results in a
“substantial threat of director liability” sufficient to give the court
pause as to whether the board could disinterestedly evaluate a

113. Corbett & Roque, supra note 17, at 858.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., In re Am. Int’l Group, Inc. Derivative Litig. 700 F. Supp. 2d. 419, 432
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that ordinary compensation is not sufficient to excuse demand and
that plaintiffs must allege specific facts calling into question the board’s independence based on
compensation).
116. Strong ex rel. Tidewater, Inc. v. Taylor, 877 F. Supp. 2d. 433, 445 (E.D. La. 2012).
117. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 340 (Del. Ch. 2012) (quoting In
re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)), rev’d on other
grounds, No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013). For a discussion of Caremark and
directors’ duty of loyalty, see infra Part III.A.1.
118. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993).
119. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (en banc).
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120

demand. Even with the expansion of loyalty and the ability to plead
demand futility by alleging a substantial likelihood of liability, serious
challenges remain for plaintiffs who allege director knowledge. As the
next Part shows, there are cases suggesting that patterns of violations
or red flags give rise to an inference of knowledge.
III. DEMAND EXCUSED: CAREMARK TYPOLOGIES
The baseline in an FCPA follow-on derivative suit is that
Caremark pleading poses an extraordinarily difficult burden for
121
plaintiffs. Courts generally give deference to a board when there is a
compliance system in place, but this deference is tempered when
there are suspicious circumstances that suggest board bias due to
122
director involvement in the wrongdoing. This Part demonstrates
that there are certain types of cases in which plaintiffs have
successfully pleaded demand futility. Oversight of violations of
positive law cases falls in the middle of a spectrum of Caremark cases.
Self-interest cases present the easiest facts under which to excuse
123
demand because there are direct personal benefits. In contrast,
cases featuring a failure to assess business risks pose the hardest facts
under which to excuse demand because even the worst investments
124
are covered by the business judgment rule. Oversight of violations
cases falls in between these two extremes because violations of
positive law neither give rise to personal benefits nor are sanctioned
by business judgment.
Because FCPA follow-on derivative suits do not fit the typical
duty of loyalty paradigm, Caremark claims arising out of regulatory
violations provide a better reference point for determining under
what circumstances courts are willing to allow a derivative suit to
proceed because a board of directors is interested or otherwise lacks

120. Id.
121. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
122. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 22, at 1792 (explaining how there is little structural
or interest bias in Caremark cases because usually subordinates would have engaged in illegal
behavior).
123. For discussion of cases in which directors backdated stock options, see supra note 112
and accompanying text.
124. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 123–24 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(holding that Caremark claims based on directors’ failure to gauge the risk of subprime
mortgages are not so much about oversight liability as about an attempt to “hold the director
defendants personally liable for making (or allowing to be made) business decisions that, in
hindsight, turned out poorly for the Company”).
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independence. Many of the Caremark cases that have excused
demand involve healthcare corporations that have violated Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) regulations or Medicare/Medicaid
125
reimbursement regulations. The healthcare industry, much like
corporate overseas activities subject to the FCPA, has experienced an
126
upward trend in government scrutiny and oversight. Another
interesting feature shared by the healthcare and FCPA Caremark
cases is the fact that many plaintiffs have resorted to courts outside of
Delaware. These cases suggest that other state courts outside of
Delaware are more willing to allow shareholder derivative suits to
127
proceed.
A. Using Knowledge To Excuse Demand
Because the standard for director liability is abstract, the
groupings of Caremark cases are a useful starting point for the very
128
fact-specific analysis of Caremark claims in the FCPA context. The
typologies show the factual scenarios that have allowed—and would
allow—a plaintiff to show that the board of directors has knowledge
of the violations. The cases excusing demand fall into one or more of
the following factual scenarios: (1) an extensive paper trail detailing a
regulatory violation, (2) business strategies that institutionalize a
regulatory violation and make the business dependent on facilitating
violations, and (3) objective indicators, such as audit reports and
oversized profits, coupled with directors’ experience, that give rise to
an inference that the board knew of a violation. Under these
scenarios, knowledge serves as the basis for excusing demand because
125. See infra Part III.A.1–3.
126. Kimberly D. Baker & Arissa M. Peterson, Post-Caremark Implications for Health Care
Organization Boards of Directors, 3 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 387, 387 (2004).
127. See Scott J. Davis & Michael T. Torres, Directors’ Monetary Liability for Actions or
Omissions Not in Good Faith 28 (unpublished manuscript) (May 22, 2009), available at
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2009/05/directors-monetary-liability-for-actions-oromissions-not-in-good-faith.pdf (explaining how two Caremark cases, McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d
808 (6th Cir. 2001) and Abbott Laboratories, a Seventh Circuit case, are indicative of other
courts’ willingness to allow oversight claims, in contrast to Delaware cases on demand).
128. See Stevelman, supra note 68, at 115 (noting how although the fiduciary duties are
“constan[t]” the true challenge lies in the application of these “fiduciary precepts to changing
factual scenarios”). Courts have looked to other demand cases to determine which factual
scenario most closely approximates shareholder allegations against directors for violations of
the FCPA. See, e.g., Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Deaton, No. H-08-1809, 2009
WL 6799492, at *7 (S.D. Tex. May 7, 2009) (“On this record, Plaintiffs’ allegations more closely
resemble those in Guttman, rather than those in Abbott.”), adopted by Midwestern Teamsters
Pension Fund v. Baker Hughes Inc., 2010 WL 3359560 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2010).
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courts can find that continued violations are not protected by the
business judgment rule (the Aronson test) or find that directors are
interested because they knew of the violations and thus, face a
substantial likelihood of liability due to their inaction (the Rales test).
1. Type One: Extensive Paper Trail and Persistent Violations.
Courts are reluctant to infer knowledge even when corporations
repeatedly violate the FCPA, but Type One cases show that reporting
systems put directors on notice of prior violations—particularly when
there are repeated violations—and provide an inference that they
knew of violations that occurred thereafter.
129
In In re Abbott Laboratories Derivative Shareholders Litigation,
the FDA assessed a civil fine against Abbott and ordered it to destroy
130
medical inventory that violated federal regulations. Before the fine,
the FDA sent four warnings to company headquarters after
131
inspections revealed that products were “adulterated.” Abbott
received warning letters even after it entered an FDA Compliance
Plan; three years after starting the Compliance Plan and four years
after the first warnings, the FDA terminated the cooperative
132
arrangement, citing Abbott’s repeated violations. The plaintiffs
alleged that Abbott’s directors were aware that the company failed to
133
comply for six years.
The district court dismissed the case after concluding that the
alleged facts did not indicate the directors were substantially likely to
134
be liable for their inaction under Rales. But the Seventh Circuit,
overturning the district court, disagreed that the directors had merely
failed to act and decided instead that Aronson was the appropriate
standard because there was evidence the directors knew about
Abbott’s violations through the warning letters and audit-committee

129. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003).
130. See id. at 798 (finding that Abbott had failed to comply with regulations for
manufacturing of diagnostic tests kits and regulations protecting human subjects from hazard
during testing).
131. Id. at 799.
132. Id. at 800.
133. Id. at 802. The plaintiffs pointed to meetings of the board and alleged that they had
received information about Abbott’s continued noncompliance. Id.
134. See In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 141 F. Supp. 2d 946, 948, 950–51
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that plaintiffs did not show that the directors knew about the violations,
and, even if they did know, that their inaction would not show that the directors did not believe
Abbott was trying to comply with the FDA); see also In re Abbott Labs., 325 F.3d at 803, 805
(citing Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993)).
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135

meetings. The decision to ignore FDA warnings was not protected
136
by the business judgment rule. Despite the difficulty inherent in
137
overcoming the business judgment rule, the Abbott plaintiffs
successfully alleged that the board’s “conscious inaction” amounted
to a violation of good faith, which was not protected by business
judgment under Aronson, and which violated Caremark oversight
138
duties.
To reach the business-judgment issue, the Seventh Circuit first
139
inferred director knowledge from the extensive paper trail. The
court interpreted the board’s knowledge and failure to address
violations as action subject to Aronson rather than inaction subject to
140
141
Rales. Unlike the directors in Caremark, the Abbott board knew
about the FDA violations due to multiple warning letters from the
FDA, meetings with FDA representatives, and newspaper articles
142
about possible detriment to Abbott.
Abbott is not a case in which a reporting system was completely
absent or inadequate. Demand futility was based on the fact that
defendant directors were aware of violations and had received notice
143
from the FDA. In fact, Abbott indicates that when there is a
reporting system in place, the court may assume that the reporting

135. In re Abbott Labs., 325 F.3d at 806.
136. See id. at 809 (“[W]e find that the plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded allegations, if true,
of a breach of the duty of good faith to reasonably conclude that the directors’ actions fell
outside the protection of the business judgment rule.”).
137. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (explaining the presumption that “directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company” and that the plaintiff challenging a board
decision bears the burden of rebutting the presumption).
138. In re Abbott Labs., 325 F.3d at 809.
139. See id. (“Given the extensive paper trail in Abbott concerning the violations and the
inferred awareness of the problems, the facts support a reasonable assumption that there was a
‘sustained [and] systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight . . . .’” (quoting In re
Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996), rev’d on other grounds,
No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013))).
140. For a discussion on the action versus inaction distinction in Aronson and Rales, see
supra notes 62–67.
141. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
142. In re Abbott Labs., 325 F.3d at 808. The court also noted that the “magnitude and
duration of the FDA violations in Abbott were so great that it occasioned the highest fine ever
imposed by the FDA.” Id. at 809.
143. Id. at 806.
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system worked as intended, and thus, that the board was aware of
144
violations and consciously decided not to act.
In the FCPA context, by contrast, courts have given defendant
directors the benefit of the doubt even in the face of persistent
violations and even—perhaps especially—when there is a compliance
145
system. In Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Deaton, a
clear pattern of FCPA violations was present: Baker Hughes
employees made illegal payments in Brazil and India in 1995 and
1998, respectively, and the company discovered these payments in
146
1999. Even after new violations in Angola, Indonesia, Nigeria,
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan emerged in 2007, the Texas
district court dismissed a derivative suit alleging that Baker Hughes
had failed to provide adequate oversight to avoid payments in
147
violation of the FCPA. The court concluded that illegal payments
took place despite the advice of the FCPA adviser and emphasized
that Baker Hughes had implemented a revised FCPA policy before
148
the 2007 violations. The Midwestern court distinguished Abbott on
the basis that the Abbott board failed to take any steps to remedy its
violations, whereas Baker Hughes made adjustments and addressed
its persistent corruption issues, even though the changes failed to
149
prevent future violations. Midwestern diverges from the main thrust
of Abbott, namely that board knowledge is inferred because
corporate reporting systems are assumed to work as they should and
that, based on the violations, the directors did nothing to comply with
150
the FDA. Instead, the Midwestern court took a different tack: the
reporting system insulated the Baker Hughes directors from liability
and was not a basis to infer board knowledge of violations, as in
Abbott. Moreover, violations after improvements to the reporting
system happened despite the reporting system and could not suggest
151
bad faith or a board failure. The Midwestern court did not dwell on
144. See id. (“Where there is a corporate governance structure in place, we must then
assume the corporate governance procedures were followed and that the board knew of the
problems and decided no action was required.” (emphasis added)).
145. Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Deaton, No. H-08-1809, 2009 WL
6799492 (S.D. Tex. May 7, 2009), adopted by Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v.
Baker Hughes Inc., 2010 WL 3359560 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2010).
146. Id. at *2.
147. Id. at *3, *11.
148. Id. at *2–3.
149. Id. at *7.
150. See In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.2d 795, 806 (7th Cir. 2003).
151. Midwestern, 2009 WL 6799492, at *8.
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the fact that for all its revisions, the compliance system still failed in
several countries, and nor did the court attempt to draw inferences
against the board or assume that the reporting system would have
worked as it was intended so that the board would be kept apprised
152
of the violations. In fact, under Midwestern, corporations can have
their cake and eat it too. A corporation can point to compliance
systems to avoid liability for an utter failure of oversight or grossly
153
inadequate system. At the same time, directors can disclaim
knowledge of violations because the compliance system was
154
inadequate and failed to alert them of subsequent violations.
Given the uncertain effect of the reporting system for the
155
purposes of the Aronson or Rales tests, district courts are likely to
reach different conclusions regarding which test to apply. The
Midwestern approach of assuming violations following revisions of
reporting systems are not actionable gives defendant directors too
much deference, whereas the Abbott approach of imputing
knowledge based on an assumption that reporting systems will work
effectively may go too far in the other direction. The best approach
would likely consider the case-specific allegations by each derivative
plaintiff regarding the particular reporting system in place and would
evaluate the adequacy of the reporting system to determine whether
the board consciously acted to ignore future violations or had
implemented rigorous checks that nevertheless failed.
2. Type Two: Knowledge Based on Overt Business Strategy by the
Board that Encouraged or Facilitated Violations. Employing a
business strategy that is dependent on violating positive law or
facilitating a violation, if sufficiently overt, is an easier path to

152. The court did, however, note the shortcomings in the pleadings of the Midwestern
plaintiffs. See infra note 194.
153. See supra notes 89–90.
154. Even a reasonably designed compliance system can fail at times. In re Caremark Int’l
Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, No. 380, 2013
WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013). But in Midwestern, the government brought complaints against
Baker Hughes for violations in six countries, after the company was put on notice after the first
set of violations in 1999 and after the intervening reform of the compliance system between
1999 and 2007. See supra notes 146–47.
155. The issue of whether Rales or Aronson applies remains an open question across
different district courts and remains unresolved by Delaware courts. See In re Intel Corp.
Derivative Litig., 621 F. Supp. 2d 165, 173 (D. Del. 2009) (outlining the different positions held
by the Seventh and Third Circuits in applying Delaware law and whether Abbott is a faithful
application of Delaware law).
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excusing demand because it suggests that the board itself encouraged
156
a violation.
In In re SFBC International, Inc., Securities & Derivative
157
Litigation, the plaintiffs alleged that PharmaNet Development
Group (PDG) violated FDA requirements for clinical trials by failing
to disclose medical risks to participants and underreporting negative
158
side effects. After PDG’s practices became public, shareholders
sued the board for “failing to correct the widespread mismanagement
159
of the company and egregious wrongdoing.” The plaintiffs alleged
PDG’s “strategy for growth and expansion” was based on a violation
160
of ethical procedures and falsification of reports. The plaintiffs
pointed to substandard testing at PDG’s largest facility which
comprised 60 percent of clinical-trial facilities and accounted for 30
161
percent of total profits—a sizeable portion of PDG’s operations.
Applying Rales, the district court concluded that the directors
had a “disabling personal interest” and could not exercise
disinterested and independent judgment because they faced a
162
substantial likelihood of liability for PDG’s business practices.
Beyond the red flags raised by FDA warnings, the directors knew or
“should have known” how the corporation conducted clinical trials,
particularly because misconduct was pervasive and not
163
decentralized. Their failure to monitor PDG’s “core business”
amounted to egregious mismanagement of clinical trials and satisfied
164
the Caremark requirement of conscious disregard for their duties.
The court emphasized that the directors knew of and should be liable
for the FDA violations because those violations stimulated PDG’s
165
business.

156. See supra note 105 and accompanying text, which explain how explicit violations of
positive law always violate the duty of loyalty and give rise to director liability.
157. In re SFBC Int’l, Inc. Sec. & Derivative Litig., 495 F. Supp. 2d 477 (D.N.J. 2007).
158. Id. at 479–80.
159. Id. at 481.
160. See id. at 480–81 (detailing mammoth clinical-testing operations where it became
endemic to use uneducated test subjects, to allow human test subjects to participate in
overlapping trials, and to conceal these violations by using conflicted review boards to oversee
the clinical trials).
161. Id. at 481.
162. Id. at 483, 485.
163. Id. at 485–86.
164. Id. at 486.
165. See id. at 485 (concluding that PDG’s “operating procedure . . . enable[d] the company
to secure and perform contracts for large drug trials”).
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In addition to which aspects of the business the violation affects,
the extent of the violations also determines whether a court will
conclude that the violations have become institutionalized in the
business strategy of a corporation. If the regulatory violation is an
isolated event, the board is less likely to be liable for the conduct. But
if there is a pattern of repeat violations, a board could be implicated
166
in supporting, or at least willfully ignoring, the violations. In cases
concerning off-label drug marketing, for example, courts have
concluded that business practices that make illegal marketing a core
business priority indicate board participation in violations,
167
particularly if there have been violations in the past. Moreover, if
red flags and previous misconduct are pervasive, the need to allege
particularized knowledge for each defendant may be and has been
168
relaxed.
Although strategic planning in off-label marketing has given rise
to inferences of director knowledge, the Delaware Court of Chancery
has been reluctant to make the same inferences from bribery
patterns. Commentators point to In re Dow Chemical Co. Derivative
169
Litigation as foreclosing all shareholder derivative suits from FCPA
170
violations. Reading Dow this broadly, however, is a mistake. In
Dow, despite assuming that Dow bribed officials in Kuwait, the court
dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit because there was no basis to conclude
171
the board knew or should have known about the bribe. Neither
previous SEC fines nor bribery incidents in other countries convinced

166. See id. (finding that the FDA violations at issue were not “merely decentralized activity
by employees of a far-flung enterprise of the company”).
167. In re Pfizer Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 722 F. Supp. 2d 453, 461–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
see La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 352, 355–56 (Del. Ch. 2012) (inferring
knowing approval of violations because the FDA sent warning letters and the company had
previously settled claims), rev’d on other grounds, No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695, at *4 (Del. Apr. 4,
2013). For a discussion of Pyott’s subsequent history, see infra Part III.B.
168. See In re Pfizer, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 462 (determining that it was “entirely reasonable” to
conclude that each director had “deliberate[ly] disregard[ed]” his duties).
169. In re Dow Chem. Co. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11,
2010).
170. See Mark, supra note 17, at 481 (“Dow may operate to bar derivative claims based on
FCPA violations and a Caremark theory.”); cf. Corbett & Roque, supra note 17, at 858–59
(explaining how Dow fits the paradigm of difficult-to-win Caremark cases).
171. In re Dow Chem., 2010 WL 66769, at *13.
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the Court of Chancery of systematic board involvement in, or board
172
knowledge of, the violations.
Nevertheless, Dow should not be read as protecting directors
from liability when there is pervasive, institutionalized bribery. As
compared to an off-label marketing case in which the plaintiffs could
point to a slide presentation to the board that listed off-label
173
marketing as a top priority,
the Dow plaintiffs were likely
unsuccessful in pleading demand futility because they based their
allegations on public rumors of violations and never inspected
corporate records. It is likely, then, that if plaintiffs use corporate
records to show a pattern of bribery, they will fare better than the
Dow plaintiffs. For example, Siemens’s FCPA violations would likely
provide some basis for inferring director knowledge from bribery
174
patterns. Siemens, the most heavily fined FCPA violator to date,
175
had a culture in which “bribery was tolerated and even rewarded.”
Investigations uncovered pervasive violations across the world in
176
addition to the institutionalization of bribery practices.
This typology would open up the possibility of inferring
knowledge when a corporation operates in countries or industries
with high indexes of corruption and when bribes to foreign officials
are central to the expansion of operations. An important limiting
principle is necessary, however, as it would go too far for bribery or

172. See id. (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that a prior fine for bribery was grounds for
knowledge because “similar conduct by different members of management, in a different
country, in an unrelated transaction . . . is simply too attenuated to support a Caremark claim”).
173. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 353 (Del. Ch. 2012), rev’d on
other grounds, 2013 WL 1264695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013).
174. Richard L. Cassin, France’s Total SA Cracks Our Top Ten List, FCPA BLOG (May 29,
2013 12:38 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/5/29/frances-total-sa-cracks-our-top-10list.html.
175. Alexandra Wrage & Anne Richardson, Siemens AG—Violations of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 48 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 232, 233 (2009).
176. See id. at 232–33 (noting how Siemens had “created elaborate payment schemes” and
recounting payments in Venezuela, China, Israel, China, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Mexico, Iraq,
Russia, and Vietnam in various different industries, all facilitated by slush funds and off-thebooks records). While the FCPA violations of Siemens lend themselves nicely to the analysis of
the different Caremark typologies, a derivative suit against Siemens would be unlikely to
succeed. Siemens, incorporated in Germany, would not be subject to Delaware corporate law;
rather, under the internal affairs doctrine, German law would determine issues of standing and
substantive duties of directors in a derivative suit. See DEMOTT, supra note 91, at 223
(explaining Delaware case law on internal corporate affairs).
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conditions conducive to bribery to be grounds for per se knowledge.
Accordingly, knowledge can be reasonably inferred when there is a
high risk or incidence of corruption and, despite these risks, the
corporation has few or inadequate controls. Given the high profile of
FCPA enforcement and compliance, no corporation could get away
178
with having absolutely no internal controls; the next logical step for
ensuring compliance is scrutiny over the adequacy of systems when
there are known bribery risks.
3. Type Three: Inferring Knowledge from Prior Experience of the
Directors or Objective Factors. Though courts often defer to the
decisions of experienced boards, directors’ previous experience with
179
violations may speak to their ability to address recurring violations.
180
In McCall v. Scott, the plaintiffs alleged pervasive violations of
Medicare and Medicaid laws in patient treatment and cost
181
182
reporting. The Sixth Circuit analyzed demand futility under Rales.
The court concluded that demand was futile because the pleadings
183
created doubt that the directors were disinterested. There were two
discernible bases for liability: (1) the directors’ prior experience and
(2) other objective indicators.
First, the directors had previously served on the corporation’s
board and as members of the compensation and audit committees;
many red flags, coupled with the board’s inaction, suggested
184
recklessness or conscious disregard by the board. The court
determined that Caremark liability did not require intentional or even
reckless infliction of harm on the corporation, and therefore, even
185
unintentional inaction could suffice. Though the allegations did not
support a finding of “corporate-wide wrongdoing,” they did suggest

177. A “bad outcome” cannot be equated with “bad faith” and a violation of a director’s
duties. King ex rel. Cephalon Inc. v. Baldino, 409 Fed. App’x 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2010); Stone ex
rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006) (en banc).
178. See, e.g., SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 751–52 (N.D. Ga. 1973)
(“No organization, no matter how small, should ignore the provisions of the FCPA
completely.”); see also supra note 89 and accompanying text.
179. Baker & Peterson, supra note 126, at 393.
180. McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001).
181. Id. at 814.
182. See id. at 816 (finding that the board’s failure to respond to systematic fraud was not
“tantamount to a conscious decision to refrain from acting”).
183. Id. at 819.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 814.
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directors were aware of improper acquisition practices by the
186
corporation. Objective indicators, including audit information, a qui
tam action, press reporting, and billing increases, also suggested that
187
directors knew of the corporate misconduct. Taken together, these
factors were enough for the court to excuse demand based on the
188
substantial likelihood of director liability.
4. Expanding Inferences of Director Knowledge. The three types
of cases presented above are factual scenarios in which plaintiffs have
successfully alleged violations of Caremark duties. Given that many
FCPA cases have been foiled by the need for plaintiffs to allege
director knowledge to show a violation in bad faith and to give rise to
substantial liability, these typologies could provide a basis for
expanding a board’s liability. In some circumstances, it will
nevertheless be difficult to infer that the board knew that violations
occurred, particularly if the violations involve isolated occurrences of
third parties paying bribes in foreign countries.
Accordingly, when FCPA violations are persistent rather than
isolated events or when they form part of business strategy more
generally, courts should be more willing to infer knowledge. Courts
outside of Delaware, at least, seem particularly generous in inferring
director knowledge based on a violation’s severity. But even
Delaware courts have inferred director knowledge in shareholder
189
derivative suits.
In American International Group, Inc. v.
190
Greenberg, the directors were directly in control of the operations in
191
which fraud occurred. In FCPA cases, however, directors generally
would not have been in direct control of the overseas operations
192
where FCPA violations are more likely to occur. Nevertheless,
186. Id. at 819, 821–22.
187. Id. at 821.
188. Id. at 824.
189. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763, 799 (Del. Ch. 2009) (holding, on a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, that the plaintiffs stated a breach of loyalty claim against defendant
directors for “knowingly tolerating inadequate internal controls and knowingly failing to
monitor their subordinate’s compliance with legal duties”). AIG is very similar to Type Two.
See supra Part III.A.2.
190. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763, 799 (Del. Ch. 2009).
191. Id. at 777 (drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiffs and determining that
“misconduct was not isolated; it permeated AIG’s way of doing business” so that it was
reasonable to infer that the defendant directors knew of fraudulent schemes).
192. See Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding the
Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. LEG. 425, 478 (2009)
(arguing against the focus on directors in anticompliance efforts and explaining how compliance
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changing the baseline of the misconduct from actual bribery to the
neglect of high-level compliance programs could be one way of
bringing the control into directors’ hands. In FCPA cases, courts have
not been quite as generous in inferring knowledge from objective
indicators. Inferring knowledge based on the risk of corruption in a
country where a company has operations, without more, would likely
193
go too far. Inferring knowledge when there is specific information
that directors knew about violations and decided not to investigate,
however, would come well within the existing bases for Caremark
liability.
B. Procedural Strategies for Pleading Demand
This Section analyzes the practical problems in shareholder
derivative litigation that would afflict FCPA follow-on litigants, even
if courts employ relaxed standards for inferring director knowledge.
1. Mitigating Conclusory Pleading: Books and Records. This
Section shows that the success of any claim, mentioned above, will be
contingent on the successful completion of a books and records
inspection. It is difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs to survive a
motion to dismiss and make sufficiently particularized allegations
194
based on public information alone. If plaintiffs continue to neglect
the opportunity to organize and inspect books and records, one way

depends on low-level employees who are the first line of defense against bribery). However, the
duty of loyalty of directors does not exempt them from overseeing foreign operations. Cf. In re
Puda Coal, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6476-CS, at 17–18 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2013), available at
http://www.delawarelitigation.com/files/2013/02/puda-case.pdf (underscoring the need for U.S.
directors’ oversight over foreign operations where a foreign director stole corporate assets).
193. Cf. Strong ex rel. Tidewater, Inc. v. Taylor, 877 F. Supp. 2d. 433, 450 (E.D. La. 2012)
(concluding that the high risk of certain overseas locations, like Nigeria and Azerbaijan, does
not give rise to an inference the board of directors knew about possible corruption or that they
intentionally failed to act).
194. See Freuler v. Parker, 803 F. Supp. 2d 630, 651 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (outlining deficiencies
in pleadings including failure to identify auditing reports and how each director should have
known the company was violating internal controls), aff’d, No. 12-20260, 2013 WL 1153058 (5th
Cir. Mar. 11, 2013) (per curiam); Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Deaton, No. H08-1809, 2009 WL 6799492 (S.D. Tex. May 7, 2009), at *8 (S.D. Tex. May 7, 2009) (“Plaintiffs’
conclusory allegations leave one free to imagine either that Baker Hughes had the most
comprehensive compliance program in the industry, or the most deficient.”), adopted by
Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Baker Hughes Inc., 2010 WL 3359560 (S.D. Tex.
May 26, 2009).
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or another, the Delaware Court of Chancery will force them to do
195
so.
Pleading demand futility imposes an extraordinarily difficult
196
burden for Caremark plaintiffs. As previously discussed, the most
197
difficult aspect of the pleadings is alleging knowledge by directors.
Public information is unlikely sufficient to allege knowledge. The
existence of a DOJ investigation, for example, is insufficient to allege
that the corporation’s directors are substantially likely to be liable
198
because they knew of the violation. In the absence of investigative
reporting, information about FCPA violations or related board
deliberations is generally not publicly available for plaintiffs seeking
199
to formulate complaints.
In Delaware, however, a shareholder may make a written
demand to inspect the corporation’s books and records under Section
200
220 of the Delaware Code. Section 220 requests are closely tied to
heightened pleading requirements for derivative suits, specifically for
Caremark pleading: “[o]nly the extremely rare complaint will be able
to establish” a link between a corporation’s legal violation and the
201
board without the benefit of “internal corporate documents.”
Despite repeated admonitions, the docket of derivative shareholder
actions has been plagued by first (or “fast”) filers, who do not inspect
202
records.

195. See Corbett & Roque, supra note 76, at 3 (noting the evident effects of Delaware’s
preference for books and records requests on litigants: plaintiffs in the Avon and Motorola
shareholder derivative suits initiated Section 220 actions prior to filing, and defendant Wal-Mart
“voluntarily produced board minutes, agendas, and its FCPA policies”).
196. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
197. For a discussion of strategies for inferring knowledge when plaintiffs cannot point to
outright director involvement, see supra Part III.A.
198. Saginaw Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No.5:10-CV-4720-EJD,
2012 WL 967063, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2012).
199. See Michael J. Borden, The Role of Financial Journalists in Corporate Governance, 12
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 311, 345–46 (2007) (explaining how in Caremark cases plaintiffs
often rely on investigative reports to draft complaints in derivative suits and as a starting point
for later stages of a case following an unsuccessful motion to dismiss and attributing this reliance
to the “lack of access to discovery”).
200. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2011).
201. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 342 (Del. Ch. 2012), rev’d on
other grounds, No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013); see id. at 342–43 (explaining the
dismissal of “a steady stream of Caremark claims” because plaintiffs did not request inspection).
202. Stevelman, supra note 68, at 111. Delaware increasingly favors the “better” complaint.
Id.
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The Delaware Court of Chancery attempted to create a fast-filer
presumption against plaintiffs who did not make Section 220 demands
203
prior to filing complaints. Vice Chancellor Laster criticized “fastfiling” plaintiffs and lawyers who treat the derivative suit as a lottery
by filing suits without any previous inspection of records or
204
investigation “in the hope that one will hit.” In Louisana Municipal
205
Police Employees’ Retirement System v. Pyott, unsuccessful plaintiffs
206
in California district court “who fail[ed] to conduct a meaningful
investigation” prior to filing and failed to plead demand futility were
207
held to be inadequate plaintiffs for collateral estoppel purposes.
Therefore, plaintiffs who later sued in Delaware were not precluded
208
from bringing a second suit. The Delaware Supreme Court, on
interlocutory appeal, reversed the application of this presumption in
209
determining the adequacy of the plaintiffs. This reversal has also
been read as preventing the Court of Chancery from using the
Section 220 demand as a prerequisite in the demand-futility
210
analysis. However, the notion that complaints without Section 220
demands are insufficient for demand-futility pleadings in Caremark
211
cases existed before Pyott. The Court of Chancery’s presumption
just attempted to formalize it: rather than dismissing cases based on
conclusory pleadings, the court attempted to apply the presumption
against the first plaintiffs in line who did not inspect records.
203. Pyott, 46 A.3d at 335–36. For other cases applying the presumption, see South v. Baker,
No. 7294-VCL, 2012 WL 4372538, at *16–18 (Del. Ch. Sept. 25, 2012) (applying the presumption
to dismiss a complaint); Baca v. Insight Enterprises, No. 5105-VCL, 2010 WL 2219715, at *5
(Del. Ch. June 3, 2010) (same); King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 994 A.2d 354, 364 (Del. Ch.
2010) (same), rev’d on other grounds, 12 A.3d 1140 (Del. 2011).
204. Pyott, 46 A.3d at 344.
205. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313 (Del. Ch. 2012), rev’d, No. 380,
2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013).
206. See In re Allergan, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. SACV 10–1352 DOC, 2012 WL
137457, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2012).
207. Pyott, 46 A.3d at 350.
208. Id. at 351.
209. Pyott v. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys, No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695, at *4 (Del. Feb. 5,
2013); see also infra Part III.B.2.
210. See Francis Pileggi, Supreme Court Reverses Chancery on Collateral Estoppel/Demand
Futility and Section 220 Issue, DEL. CORP. & LITIG. BLOG (Apr. 8, 2013),
http://www.delawarelitigation.com/2013/04/articles/delaware-supreme-court-updates/supremecourt-reverses-chancery-on-collateral-estoppeldemand-futility-issue (noting that Pyott likely
“diminishes the impact” of other decisions questioning the adequacy of plaintiffs who had not
filed Section 220 demand before alleging demand futility).
211. See Pyott, 46 A.3d at 343, nn.22–23 (enumerating the many times plaintiff’s cases were
dismissed for failing to use Section 220 proceedings).
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Effectively, the presumption would have added another step to the
212
shareholder derivative suit.
Even without the presumption, plaintiffs—who already face a
difficult pleading burden under Caremark—do themselves a
disservice by skipping the Section 220 demand, particularly in FCPA
follow-on derivative suits. In fact, criticism for failing to make a
Section 220 demand underlies the dismissal of FCPA follow-on
derivative suits. In Dow, the Court of Chancery’s only FCPA case
thus far, the plaintiff’s failure to inspect books and records was
213
detrimental to claims questioning the directors’ independence.
Thus, plaintiffs alleging deficiency in FCPA compliance programs
214
would similarly benefit from making a Section 220 demand.
2. The Problem of Multijurisdictional Litigation. This Section
explains the phenomenon of multijurisdictional litigation (MJL)
arising from the fast-filing problem discussed above. Because most
jurisdictions allow the first filed complaint to move forward, litigants
across the country rush to the courthouse to bring the same claims
against a corporation. In addition to facing the possibility of dismissal
for failing to request books, litigants also face the possibility of being
215
beaten by a faster plaintiff who will then control the litigation. The
main loci in MJL are typically the state of incorporation and the
216
principal place of business. MJL disadvantages defendants who are
217
forced to litigate in multiple jurisdictions and who then respond
212. See Jacobs, supra note 60, at 5–6 (2007) (detailing the “unforeseen consequence” of
Aronson’s pleading requirements was the outgrowth of different motions, including demand
excused motions, class certification to circumvent the demand requirement, and Section 220
proceedings to inspect books and records for particularized futility pleading).
213. See In re Dow Chem. Co. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769, at *9 n.50
(Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010) (reprimanding plaintiffs for failing to use Section 220 to “flesh out their
unparticularized allegations of a ‘clubby’ inner circle on the Dow board” and saying that “[h]ad
they done so . . . their allegations might have met the requirements of Rule 23.1”).
214. Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Deaton, No. H-08-1809, 2009 WL
6799492, at *8 (S.D. Tex. May 7, 2009) (finding that the plaintiffs did not offer more than
speculation about the implementation of policies and procedures and “leave one free to imagine
either that Baker Hughes has the most comprehensive compliance program in the industry, or
the most deficient”), adopted by Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Baker Hughes
Inc., 2010 WL 3359560 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2010).
215. Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation: Who Caused
This Problem and Can It Be Fixed?, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 13 (2012). In contrast to the federal
panel on multidistrict litigation, there is no “unified system for handling [MJL] on a national
scale.” Id. at 4 n.12.
216. Id. at 5.
217. Id. at 7.
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with a motion to stay the proceedings in order to litigate in only one
forum. To resolve this problem, a court may issue a stay in favor of
another jurisdiction when there are concurrent claims. There is no
218
guarantee, however, that courts will always be so deferential. The
issue of how to handle simultaneous, parallel derivative suits remains
unresolved, particularly because there is no presumption to disqualify
whichever plaintiff failed to file a request to inspect books and
219
records.
The problem of MJL is simplified, however, when a jurisdiction
has already decided one of the suits, given that collateral estoppel
would preclude subsequent shareholders from alleging the same
injury and grounds for demand futility. The resolution of a collateralestoppel issue in an FCPA follow-on derivative suit is relatively
220
straightforward. In Holt v. Golden, plaintiffs filed suit against Smith
& Wesson’s directors and officers under Caremark for “failing to
221
have effective FCPA controls and oversight.” The suit in Holt was
filed in federal district court in Massachusetts, and the defendants
moved to dismiss for failure to make demand and because a state
court had previously dismissed a derivative suit on the grounds that
222
demand was not futile. The district court held that the state court’s
223
prior dismissal barred a second derivative suit. The state court’s
judgment was preclusive because (1) the core issue was the same—the
board’s ability to resolve demand—and (2) the board’s interest was
the same in 2008 and in 2011 because the board composition was the
224
same.
The district court’s analysis indicated that so long as the second
complaint pleads demand futility with reference to the same or nearly
the same composition of the board, then a prior court’s demand225
futility analysis precludes reconsideration. It does not matter that
later plaintiffs allege different facts that could excuse demand if those
218. See Stevelman, supra note 68, at 108–11 (detailing how Delaware is increasingly
reluctant to cede jurisdiction when there is another complaint pending in a different state
court).
219. Pyott v. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys., No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695, at *3–4 (Del. Apr.
4, 2013).
220. Holt v. Golden, 880 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Mass. 2012).
221. Id. at 201.
222. Id.
223. See id. at 202 (finding that the state court concluded there was no reasonable doubt a
majority of the board was disinterested and independent).
224. Id. at 203.
225. Id.
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facts were previously available. This approach is consistent with the
outcome in the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Pyott.
Reasoning that full faith and credit required the Court of Chancery to
accept the California district court’s dismissal of the derivative suit
227
against Allergan for violations of off-label marketing laws, the
Supreme Court precluded the later Delaware plaintiffs from bringing
228
suit after California had dismissed a similar suit. Although the
Court of Chancery’s analysis of demand futility is a useful data point
229
for determining what sets of facts excuse demand, dismissal of the
first suit in California rendered moot any future plaintiff actions.
Under current law, collateral estoppel remains the operative doctrine
when one jurisdiction has already rendered a final judgment.
Pyott eroded the latest attempt by the Court of Chancery to
employ “strong-arm tactics to force forum” or to claim “unique
230
competence to interpret and apply Delaware’s corporate law.” The
Delaware Supreme Court still recognized the challenge of fast filing
231
and MJL. Moreover, the Court of Chancery is increasingly acting as
a preemptive gatekeeper of derivative suits by dismissing cases that
232
fail to conform to the “idealized” shareholder action. Even with
formal case management presumptions removed from its toolbox, the
Court of Chancery is taking a more proactive role in shepherding
plaintiffs through the necessary steps. For example, in the Wal-Mart
cases, the Court of Chancery refused to appoint a lead plaintiff out of
the seven plaintiffs with pending suits in Delaware. Instead, the court

226. See, e.g., In re Sonus Networks, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., 499 F.3d 47, 63 (1st Cir.
2007) (giving preclusive effect under Massachusetts law to the first derivative suit and denying
later derivative plaintiffs the opportunity to rely on facts alleged in a second complaint because
those facts were available at the time of the first suit).
227. Pyott v. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys., No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695, at *2 (Del. Apr. 4,
2013).
228. Id. at *4.
229. See supra Part III.A.2.
230. Stevelman, supra note 68, at 64.
231. Pyott, 2013 WL 1364695, at *4.
232. See La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 344–46 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(describing the “idealized” shareholder action as one where “dispersed stockholders could act
collectively following a corporate trauma . . . . They would not file suit hastily . . . [and the]
stockholder collective would recognize there is no need to rush. . . . Rather than filing hastily,
the hypothetical stockholder collective would proceed deliberately. . . . [I]t would conduct an
investigation and seek books and records . . . . [I]f the books and records showed director
misconduct, then stockholders could decide to pursue a claim . . . [and] the costly process of
briefing and arguing motions to dismiss would take place at once”), rev’d on other grounds, 2013
WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013).
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appointed three co-lead plaintiffs and ordered a consolidated
233
complaint, but only after a Section 220 action.
IV. THE VALUE OF FOLLOW-ON DERIVATIVE LITIGATION TO
COMPLIANCE EFFORTS
Given the criticisms levied against shareholder derivative suits in
234
the aftermath of FCPA violations and scandals, this Part attempts to
provide a more nuanced view of what value plaintiffs add to the
compliance efforts of a corporation, even when their claims are
unlikely to succeed. First, there is the effect of articulating standards
which carry only a minuscule chance of liability but can still affect
how corporations internally structure compliance systems and how
directors regard their oversight duties. After all, Caremark duties,
propounded by the Court of Chancery in dicta, “became the leading
standard of review for claims alleging breach of a board’s oversight
235
obligations.” Second, even outside of the typology of cases that
could proceed beyond demand-futility stages, there is intrinsic value
to cases that have been settled by plaintiffs concerned with
encouraging robust compliance measures. This Part ends with a
description of which plaintiffs and cases lead to the best litigation and
settlement outcomes.
A. Value of Demand Futility Litigation
Whether derivative suits based on Caremark claims actually
deter violations by the corporation remains an open question in
236
corporate law. There may be some deterrent effect because
procedurally, shareholder derivative suits can be very burdensome for
a corporation that faces suits by multiple plaintiffs across different
jurisdictions. Moreover, if plaintiffs begin to heed the Court of
Chancery’s frequent admonitions, directors are likely to face more
Section 220 motions from plaintiffs who genuinely want to hold
boards accountable for violations.
233. Order Regarding Case Management at *6–7, In re Wal-Mart Stores Inc. Derivative
Litig., Nos. 7455-CS, 7470-CS, 7477-CS, 7489-CS, 7490-CS, 7612-CS, 7630-CS (Del. Ch. Sept. 5,
2012).
234. See supra note 19 and accompanying text and infra note 240 and accompanying text.
235. Stephen Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967,
974 (2009).
236. See Kenneth B. Davis Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit, 61 VAND. L. REV. 387, 433
(2008) (indicating that the threat of derivative suits plays a role in deterring major violations
and, if such suits are brought, defendant directors seek to settle them quickly).
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Defining the contours of unacceptable board responses to FCPA
violations, though unlikely to lead to outright liability, may still
237
encourage new perceptions of acceptable behavior by directors. In
considering demand-futility cases, courts have an opportunity to give
greater teeth to the compliance and oversight duties of directors,
238
particularly as they relate to violations of positive federal law.
Moreover, opinions on the sufficiency of pleadings and the
boundaries of substantial likelihood of liability to excuse demand are
some of the only precedents that mark the boundaries of director
oversight duties. Although Caremark liability is a remote possibility,
follow-on derivative suits enable courts to prescribe how directors
interact with compliance systems and what role, if any, they should
exercise beyond merely establishing these systems.
B. Value of Shareholder Complaints
Despite the heavy burdens of demand-futility pleading, plaintiffs
have not been deterred in the FCPA context or perhaps in Caremark
cases generally. In FCPA follow-on derivative suits against
corporations with a history of violations similar to Wal-Mart or
Siemens, plaintiffs could marshal sufficient facts to make a strong
showing of at least one of the Caremark typologies. This would
require alleging a pattern of violations that were internally regulated
and formed part of a business strategy across countries. A better case
is one in which directors tacitly or explicitly sanctioned bribes to
facilitate business. The unsuccessful cases are those in which bribes
were isolated events or were carried out by third parties without the
239
knowledge of corporate management.

237. See Gold, supra note 86, at 515–16, 520–21 (suggesting that although the expansion of
the duty of loyalty does not lead to liability, directors’ perceptions of loyalty may nevertheless
change and alter their behavior by facilitating opposition on the basis of loyalty to actions that
are in a grey area of loyalty); Hill & McDonnell, supra note 22, at 1794, 1796 (explaining the
normative function of Caremark in encouraging desirable behavior in directors and the “rush to
abide” by Caremark and in encouraging courts to use good faith as a “‘bully pulpit’”).
238. Davis, supra note 236, at 437 (explaining that demand requirement cases remain
important precedents that define the liability of directors, even when demand is not actually
excused).
239. Under the FCPA, the doctrine of respondeat superior extends liability to corporations
even for the actions of rogue employees because they are considered agents of the corporation.
COMM. ON INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS, N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, THE FCPA AND ITS IMPACT ON
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 4 (2011), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/
pdf/report/uploads.
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1. Corporate Governance Initiatives. The Caremark typologies
analysis for excusing demand based on director knowledge does not
address cases in which corruption mechanisms are decentralized.
Follow-on derivative litigation may seem “parasitic,” motivated only
by attorneys’ fees, or unnecessary in light of government
240
enforcement. As FCPA shareholder settlements show, however,
even when plaintiffs file claims that will fail to excuse demand, they
are still motivated to influence corporate governance and behavior.
Corporate governance reform, rather than pure financial recovery, is
241
a major feature of FCPA follow-on derivative-suit settlements. In
fact, settlements in FCPA follow-on derivative suits have not yielded
high monetary sums—certainly no sum that approximates DOJ or
242
SEC settlements. Although one could speculate that the lack of
outright financial recovery is a sign the suits were meritless, FCPA
follow-on derivative plaintiffs have negotiated considerable reforms,
exceeding typical corporate reforms in other types of derivative
243
suits. Moreover, these corporate reforms may represent a different
type of financial value, namely the long-term reduction in corporate
costs associated with FCPA violations.

/FCPAImpactonInternationalBusinessTransactions.pdf. Although FCPA civil and criminal
liability is perhaps exceedingly broad, this Note acknowledges that civil liability for directors
arising from the actions of rogue agents would likely add little to overall compliance efforts.
240. For a perspective on the parasitic nature of follow-on derivative suits, see supra note 19
and accompanying text; see also Can We Sue Our Way to Prosperity?: Litigation’s Effect on
America’s Global Competitiveness: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 40 (2011) (statement of John H. Beisner, U.S. Chamber
Inst. for Legal Reform) (criticizing FCPA derivative suits for “piggyback[ing]” onto government
investigations and being motivated only by the “deep pockets” of company insurers).
241. See Lucinda Low, Sean Griffin & Shannon MacMichael, What Sets SciClone’s FCPA
Derivative Suit Apart, STEPTOE (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.steptoe.com/publicationspdf.html/pdf/?item_id=7897 (noting that unlike most FCPA collateral litigation in which the
main objective is the collection of fees—fees that are sometimes much greater than government
penalties—the SciClone settlement was focused on compliance initiatives).
242. Compare Brown et al., supra note 15 (reprint at 1) (noting high settlements in followon litigation generally, but specifically referencing securities shareholder class actions in which
settlements “exceeded by large margins any fines the accused company paid to the government”
including $15.5 million when the government settlement was $500,000), with FCPA Autumn
Review 2012, MILLER CHEVALIER (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.millerchevalier.com/Publications/
MillerChevalierPublications?find=89901 (noting that no settlement has resulted in a major
financial award, with attorneys’ fees ranging between $2.5 million and $10 million).
243. See, e.g., In re Johnson & Johnson Derivative Litig., 900 F. Supp. 2d 467, 488 (D.N.J.
2012) (determining that corporate reforms were “more substantial and tailored” than typical
corporate reforms that are no more than “window dressing cloaking what amounts to nothing
more than a strike suit designed to line the pockets of greed-stricken counsel”).
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In a settlement between Johnson & Johnson and plaintiffs who
filed suit after FDA and FCPA violations came to light, the plaintiffs
alleged a breach of fiduciary duties. The corporation moved to
dismiss but the parties entered into settlement negotiations before the
244
court ruled on the motion. The federal district court in New Jersey
that approved the settlement noted that the creation of an oversight
committee of independent directors rectified the corporation’s
shortcomings by creating “company-wide control and assurance
systems that are designed to effectively supplement J&J’s
245
Whereas
this
decentralized
management
approach.”
246
“decentraliz[ation]” would likely have spelled doom for plaintiffs
trying to show specific director involvement in business strategy that
included bribes, the settlement negotiations provided plaintiffs a
means of influencing corporate governance without the burdens of
demand pleading. Moreover, the court found that the corporate
reforms “confer[red] a substantial benefit” on the defendant
247
corporation.
For SciClone and Halliburton, corporate reforms were designed
248
to address future FCPA risks. The SciClone settlement stipulated
very specific corporate reforms—such as the creation of a
“compliance coordinator” who is fluent in Mandarin and English—
indicating that the parties likely tailored the agreement to the specific
249
risks SciClone faced in FCPA compliance.
Moreover, the
agreement also stipulated the chain of reporting from the compliance
244. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement at 6, In re Johnson & Johnson, 900 F. Supp.
2d 467 (No. 11-2511), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/200406/
000020040612000115/a201207168-kexhibit992stip.htm.
245. In re Johnson & Johnson, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 487.
248. See e.g., Stipulation of Settlement at 15–16, In re SciClone Pharm., Inc. S’holder
Derivative Litig., No. CIV 499030 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 2010) [hereinafter “SciClone
Stipulation of Settlement”] (requiring the corporation to undertake due diligence prior to hiring
third-party agents abroad as well as to conduct periodic due-diligence inquiries and to
competitively compensate agents with fixed salaries to avoid corruption and commissions),
available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/SCLN/1444862867x0x508025/6f6c3478-e7774893-9044-b3e3f7f51616/Stipulation_of_Settlement.pdf; Stipulation of Settlement at 20–21,
Policemen & Firemen Ret. Sys. of Detroit v. Cornelison, No. 2009-29987 (Tex. Dist. Ct. July 9,
2012) [hereinafter “Halliburton Stipulation of Settlement”] (modifying the code of business
conduct to require due diligence prior to hiring consultants abroad and requiring enhanced
FCPA
training
for
employees
in
“high-risk
countries”),
available
at
http://www.halliburton.com/public/news/pubsdata/press_release/2012/policemen_firemen_cause
no2009_29987.pdf.
249. SciClone Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 248, at 9.

JARA IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

240

9/18/2013 8:43 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:199

coordinator to the audit committee, as well as the frequency of
250
meetings and the board review of anticorruption policies. The
specificity of this provision scrutinizes the adequacy of the
compliance program; a court likely would not engage in such scrutiny
in its demand-futility analysis due to the force of the business
251
judgment rule. Still, a requirement that the board of directors
promptly consider voluntary disclosure to the SEC or DOJ in the
event of future violations suggests that the plaintiff shareholders
acknowledge the primary role of government enforcement in FCPA
252
compliance. At the same time, shareholders may also be able to
pressure corporations by reprimanding individual directors and
253
officers.
2. Predicting Success. Features of follow-on derivative suits may
be predictive of the corporate governance-oriented goals of derivative
plaintiffs and the added value of shareholder derivative suits to
general compliance. For example, institutional investors as plaintiffs
and the consolidation of cases may predict a settlement that includes
254
corporate governance reforms. These predictive factors should not
be surprising. Multiple complaints may be expected when violations
are particularly egregious. Moreover, institutional investors are
generally considered more activist than other investors and more

250. Id.
251. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(“Obviously the level of detail that is appropriate for such an information system is a question
of business judgment.”), rev’d on other grounds, No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013).
252. SciClone Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 248, at 12–13; see also Halliburton
Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 248, at 2 (shielding directors from liability if they disclosed
violations to the government and cooperated with the investigation).
253. See SciClone Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 248, at 17 (requiring the board to
consider implementing a policy that would clawback all the compensation earned by an officer
during the period of misstating bribes as corporate expenses); Halliburton Stipulation of
Settlement, supra note 248, at 1–2 (stipulating that the bonuses and compensation of directors
will be revoked if the director participated or directly supervised an individual responsible for
the bribery, as determined by disinterested directors of a separate committee). It is interesting
that the clawback positions represent different levels of liability risk for directors, with
accounting misstatements leaving directors more vulnerable to liability than direct supervision.
254. In the three settlements agreed to by Johnson & Johnson, Halliburton, and SciClone,
respectively, multiple cases were consolidated and at least one case had been brought by an
institutional investor. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, supra note 244, at 3–4; SciClone
Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 248, at 1; Halliburton Stipulation of Settlement, supra note
248, at 1–2.
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interested in corporate-governance issues. Activist institutional
investors should to some extent be motivated by the substantial size
256
of their investment. Institutional investors should therefore be
interested in ensuring compliance for the sake of preserving the value
of their investment and avoiding the hefty fines and drops in stock
prices that come with FCPA government enforcement. Quite
ingeniously, FCPA compliance provides an opportunity for
institutional investors to play a greater role in the management of
corporations. A growing focus on compliance and oversight duties
may lead to greater institutional investor involvement in what
typically would have been board-exclusive matters.
Substantively, complaints with facts that do not raise business
risk allegations are more likely to result in successful settlement
257
negotiations. FCPA cases came of age in the era of mortgagebacked securities (MBS) litigation. The convergence in time of FCPA
and MBS litigation is partly to blame for the myopic view of
Caremark duties for directors in the FCPA context. Because MBS
cases raise paradigmatic concerns about the business judgment of
directors, Caremark cases are generally viewed with skepticism, even
when in the case of FCPA follow-on derivative suits there may be
egregious failures in oversight duties. MBS and business risk do not
lend themselves to easy compliance systems and thus are problematic
258
in a Caremark analysis for oversight failures.
But the outcomes of MBS cases like In re Citigroup Inc.
259
Shareholder Derivative Litigation should not be generalized to
Caremark cases based on violations of positive law. With the FCPA,
255. See Randall S. Thomas, The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate
Governance and Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L. REV. 299, 300–01 (2008) (noting the
prominent role institutional investors play in corporate governance, including bringing
shareholder proposals, serving as lead plaintiffs, and influencing shareholder votes).
256. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers:
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions To Participate
in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 416–17 (2005) (noting that
securities reform efforts have attempted to “harness[] the economic self-interest” of
institutional investors with large holdings). Despite reform efforts, empirical evidence shows
institutional investors have a “dismal record” in bringing suits in the securities class action
context. Id. at 425.
257. See Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 988 (arguing that complaints regarding “red flags
involving illegal behavior” are more likely to succeed as compared to risk-management
failures).
258. Id. at 982.
259. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). For a
description of the case’s holding, see supra note 124.

JARA IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

242

9/18/2013 8:43 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:199

there are compliance requirements, and the obligations of directors
are more easily defined within the parameters of what the law
requires. For example, a plaintiff may succeed in challenging the
compliance system because it fails to account for vulnerabilities in
countries where corruption is particularly prevalent. The same
plaintiff, however, would be unsuccessful in alleging a breach of
fiduciary duty based on the board’s decision to do business in a
corruption-ridden country. A plaintiff may challenge the compliance
system and the director’s response to violations of the FCPA, but
collateral attacks against the legitimate business choice underlying the
violation would likely destroy Caremark pleading or, alternatively,
prospects of a favorable settlement.
Thus, the foregoing discussion outlines the characteristics in
derivative suits that would be determinative in how a court gauges a
plaintiff’s pleadings and would accordingly lend leverage to plaintiffs
260
in settlement negotiations. With the Court of Chancery closely
managing the Wal-Mart case proceedings—proceedings that closely
261
approximate the “idealized” suit—perhaps the unsuccessful trend of
follow-on derivative suits in the FCPA context will finally end.
Excusing demand would be a significant, though not impossible,
departure from Delaware courts’ stance on shareholder derivative
suits. More likely, a settlement between the plaintiffs and Wal-Mart
will include compliance reforms and greater input from institutional
262
plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
As levels and targets of government enforcement of the FCPA
evolve, private plaintiffs will continue attempts to establish bases for
director liability to account for the losses to corporations from
settlements and disgorgements. The lack of successful follow-on
derivative suits can be attributed to plaintiffs’ failure to account for

260. The predictive features of success add gloss to the “idealized” shareholder suit
described by the Delaware Court of Chancery. See Part IV.B.2; see also La. Mun. Police Emps.
Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 338, 344 (Del. Ch. 2012) (explaining the “idealized” shareholder
derivative suit which includes collective shareholder action and resourceful plaintiffs), rev’d on
other grounds, 2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013).
261. Pyott, 46 A.3d at 338.
262. See Low et al., supra note 241 (noting how recent settlements including corporatecompliance reforms “create[] significant rigidity in what has been a dynamic area [of compliance
obligations], and put[] shareholders at the table in establishing controls that heretofore have
been the province of management and the board of directors”).
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the procedural burdens of the derivative suit. Delaware precedent
and the decisions of other courts, however, indicate that demand
could be excused based on director knowledge of FCPA violations in
at least a subset of cases. Because demand-futility cases provide an
avenue for understanding the substantive duties of directors, these
cases are particularly important for deepening a corporation’s
understanding of FCPA violations and liability. Moreover, even if few
cases will actually excuse demand, the complaints by shareholders
who are well-organized and interested in corporate governance add
to the general framework of FCPA compliance. Settlements by FCPA
derivative plaintiffs are notable because they target the specific
company deficiencies in compliance and give shareholders greater
input. Indeed, the FCPA follow-on derivative suit is both changing
our conceptions of director liability for FCPA violations and
revealing new insights into the role and value of derivative suits in the
process.

